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An Attempt to Level the Playing Field:
Obtaining Resources in
State and Federal Habeas
David D. Leshner
I. Introduction
Ofall the capital cases reviewed in federal habeas proceedings between 1976
and 1991, nearly half (46%) were found to contain federal constitutional error.'
With this disturbing statistic lurking in the background, counsel providing habeas
representation to persons convicted of capital murder have their work cut out for
them. Because many constitutional errors cannot be detected by simply review-
ing the trial transcript, habeas counsel must re-investigate the entire case to
determine potential sources of constitutional error. To expect one or even two
attorneys to adequately perform this task without assistance is simply asking too
much.
This article examines the interrelationship between habeas in Virginia and
federal habeas, concentrating on the necessary steps which state habeas counsel
must take to preserve federal claims for review in the federal courts. It then
explores the ways in which federal habeas counsel may obtain government
funding for investigative, expert and other services sought during the course of
representation in federal habeas proceedings. The goal is to obtain such services
simply to allow habeas counsel to adequately and effectively represent a death-
sentenced prisoner in this last step of the legal process before execution.
II. Habeas Corpus in the Virginia Courts
In theory, state habeas in Virginia exists for defendants2 whose trials con-
tained constitutional error.3 In practice, however, habeas corpus proceedings in
Virginia are nothing more than a dangerous formality because, although relief at
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A., University
of Virginia. Thanks to Professors Geimer and White for their guidance and for sharing with us
their belief in the importance of the Sixth Amendment.
1. James S. Liebman, More Than 'Skght Rtro:' The Rhnoquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus
Jursdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 541 n.15 (1990-1991).
2. Although a convicted criminal defendant assumes the role of "petitioner" when filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this article simply refers to the convicted criminal as "defen-
dant" regardless of the stage of the proceedings.
3. Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974).
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this point is highly unlikely, the possibility for procedural default of valid federal
claims is very real.
In 1995, Virginia amended its habeas procedures for persons convicted of
capital murder.4 All habeas petitions for capital defendants must be filed with the
Supreme Court of Virginia.' The court has the authority to either dismiss the
petition or order the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on specific
issues.' To date, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never ordered an evidentiary
hearing, instead granting the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the petition
in every case.
In light of these facts, the realistic objective of state habeas representation in
Virginia may well be one of preserving federal claims rather than obtaining relief
on the merits. Because of the importance of properly presenting federal claims
in state habeas, this section briefly discusses the basics of Virginia habeas law.
By the time state habeas counsel takes a case, multiple claims may already
be procedurally defaulted. The Supreme Court of Virginia adheres strictly to its
rule that all claims not properly preserved at trial, assigned as error, and briefed
to the court on direct appeal are procedurally defaulted and not cognizable on
state habeas review. It is well settled that failure to follow a state procedural rule
which results in a federal claim being procedurally defaulted in state court
constitutes an independent and adequate state ground which bars federal habeas
review of the claim.' This bar to federal review of federal claims created by the
independent and adequate state grounds doctrine is not relaxed in capital cases.'
All claims of constitutional error which can be gleaned from the trial record
must be raised on direct appeal." If this is done properly, then these claims will
be preserved for federal habeas review because claims considered on direct
appeal cannot be raised in state habeas." Thus, the state habeas petition should
4. See Gregory J. Weinig, Virginia's New State Habeas: What Evey Attorny Needs To Know,
CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 8, no. 1, p. 31 (1995).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(C)(1) (Michie 1998).
6. Id.
7. Slayton, 205 S.E.2d at 682.
8. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,729 (1991). See Carey L. Cooper, The Never Ending
Stog: Combating ProceduralBarsIn CapitalCases,CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 3 8 (1997) (discussing pro-
cedural default barriers to review in Virginia and offering suggestions for avoidance of these pitfalls).
9. In Coleman, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307
S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983). The Circuit Court denied Coleman's state habeas petition. Coleman's state
habeas attorney filed his notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia three days after the
filing deadline. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that all of the defendant's claims were
procedurally defaulted. The U.S. Supreme Court applied the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine and held that the federal courts could not hear Coleman's constitutional claims.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
10. Claims of ineffective assistance are not cognizable on direct appeal and therefore must
be raised for the first time in state habeas. Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98, 105 n.4 (Va.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996).
11. Hawks v. Cox, 175 S.E.2d 271 (Va. 1970). Hawks operates as a collateral estoppel rule
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only include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence under Brady v. Mayland, n misconduct involving jurors and the
trial judge and claims of innocence tied to constitutional error. 3 Of course, it is
essential that the state habeas petition include such claims because they will
otherwise be unreviewable at federal habeas. 4
The very nature of the claims that are cognizable at state and federal habeas
reveals the need for resources in investigating and presenting these claims in
habeas proceedings. The basis for all of these claims can be discovered only
through a re-investigation of the entire case. In light of this, habeas counsel's
need for investigative and expert resources during state and federal habeas
proceedings is clear.
A realistic assessment of state habeas in Virginia must recognize that the
Supreme Court of Virginia will almost certainly deny all requests for resources
in state habeas proceedings."5 However, to maximize the chances that expert and
investigative resources will be granted at federal habeas, state habeas counsel
should file a request with the Supreme Court of Virginia for expert and investiga-
tive assistance in the preparation of the petition. Counsel should then renew the
request for expert and investigative resources when the state habeas petition is
filed. Of course, the odds are overwhelming that the Supreme Court of Virginia
will deny the motion for pre-petition resources and then grant the Attorney
General's motion to dismiss the petition, thus rendering moot the post-petition
request for resources. However, by raising all potential claims in the state habeas
petition and requesting that the Supreme Court of Virginia authorize the appoint-
ment of expert and investigative services, the state habeas counsel will accom-
plish two very important goals. First, the federal claims will be preserved for
review in federal habeas proceedings. Second, the defendant will be able to show
that he has not "failed" to develop the factual basis for the federal claims in the
state proceedings.16
rather than a procedural default rule. Thus, it does not prevent federal review of federal claims
properly preserved through the direct appeal stage of the proceedings. Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d
872, 890 (4th Cir. 1994). Under Turner, when a claim is properly raised on direct appeal, state
habeas counsel need not include the claim in the state habeas petition as it is already preserved for
federal habeas review.
12. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13. See infra Section III, Part E.
14. Take, for example, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Roach, this claim
cannot be raised on direct appeal. However, if state habeas counsel does not raise the claim, and
the claim is subsequently presented during federal habeas proceedings, the federal court will dismiss
the claim because it has not been exhausted in the state courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(1982). Upon remand, the claim will be dismissed by the Supreme Court of Virginia as procedurally
defaulted and further federal court review will thus be precluded.
15. Virginia's new state habeas procedures for death-sentenced prisoners went into effect in
1996. Under the new procedures, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never granted a defendant's
request for resources in habeas proceedings.
16. The potential significance of this point is discussed in Section III, Parts D and E, infra.
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III Obtaining Resources in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
A. Introduction
Habeas counsel representing indigent defendants in federal habeas proceed-
ings are presented with a formidable task. After sifting through the "accumulat-
ing and often Byzantine restrictions" 7 that the federal courts and Congress have
imposed on federal habeas corpus review, defense counsel must determine what
federal claims have not been procedurally defaulted and also whether any de-
faulted federal claims might be resurrected for consideration on the merits by the
federal district court. All this, of course, is merely the precursor to further
investigation of viable claims and preparation of the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
This part of the article examines the availability of federal funding to
defense counsel for resources in connection with federal habeas cases involving
capital defendants. Such resources, while not available in all federal habeas
capital cases, are more readily obtainable than in state habeas proceedings before
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Particular attention is paid to those provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 recently amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")'8 and the potential effect of these amended
sections on the availability of resources in federal habeas proceedings. Finally,
this section examines the ways in which procedurally defaulted claims may be
resurrected for consideration on the merits by the federal courts and suggests
ways in which the federal resource statutes may aid in this endeavor.
B. The Federal Resource Statutes 9
Federal law provides compensation for defense counsel representing
defendants convicted of capital offenses in federal habeas proceedings and
federal funds for services obtained in connection with the representation:
17. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1263 (1994) (BlackmunJ., dissenting from denial of
writ of certiorari).
18. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. This article addresses only those provisions of
AEDPA which may be relevant to requests for resources; however, the effects of AEDPA are far-
reaching. See Jeanne-Marie Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking W~rt, Part . Habeas Corpus Under the
Anti-Ter rism and Effective Death PenalyAct of 1996, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9., no. 1, p. 52 (1996); & Mary
Eade, The Incredibk Shrinking Writ, Part II: Habeas Corous Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, CAP. DE. J., vol. 9., no. 2, p. 55 (1997).
19. This article focuses solely on 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) as a source of resources in federal
habeas proceedings. Another source of federal funding for resources is found under 18 U.S.C.
§3006 A(e). Section 3006 provides for the appointment of investigative, expert, and other services
necessar for adequate representation for defendants unable to afford such services. Section 3006
presents two main disadvantages when compared to section 848 as a source of resources for
defendants facing the death penalty. First, section 3006 requires a threshold showing by the
defendant that the services sought are necessar for the representation, while section 848 requires
only that the services be reasonab necessary. Second, and more importantly, section 3006 authorizes
only up to $1,000 to be awarded for all services in a case. In contrast, section 848 authorizes
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[iln any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28,
seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative,
expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appoint-
ment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in
accordance with paragraphs... (9).'
Subparagraph (9), referred to above, provides that:
[u]pon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably
necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with
issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defen-
dant's attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so
authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses therefor under
paragraph (10).21
Section 848(q)(4)(B) grants capital defendants unable to obtain adequate repre-
sentation a mandatory right to counsel in section 2254 postconviction proceed-
ings.' This right to counsel is absolute and, as such, cannot be conditioned on
the potential merits of the defendant's federal habeas claims.'
In sum, habeas counsel may obtain funds for investigative, expert, or other
services under 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 8 (q)(9 ) upon a showing that (1) the defendant is
financially unable to pay for the services for which funds are sought and (2) the
services are "reasonably necessary" for the representation of the defendant.24
Section 848 does not provide a definition of "reasonably necessary," and the
courts have failed to develop a uniform standard, instead evaluating requests for
resources on an ad hoc basis. One general principle which emerges from the
expenses of up to $7,500 in an individual case. The only potential advantage to using section 3006
is that, once the defendant shows that the services requested are necessary for adequate representa-
tion, the court has a mandatory duty to authorize payment for such services. Under section 848,
the district court's authorization of payment for services is discretionary even where the defendant
shows that such services are reasonably necessary for the representation. Section 848 originally
placed a mandatory duty on district courts to authorize payment for resources shown by defendants
to be reasonably necessary. AEDPA amended the section to make this duty discretionary.
However, this author was unable to find any case law which either (1) discusses any changes in
standards to be applied by the federal courts based on the newly discretionary status of section 848
or (2) found services to be reasonably necessary but exercised discretionary authority and refused
to authorize the provision of such services.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).
21. 21 U.S.C. 848(q)(9).
22. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 854. Compensation for counsel appointed under section
848(q)(4)(B) is set by statute. The current maximum rate is $125 per hour for in-court and out-of-
court time. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10)(A).
23. Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124,127 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
24. As noted, a cap of $7,500 is placed on fees and expenses paid for expert, investigative,
and other reasonably necessary services awarded under section 848(q)( 9). Expenditures in excess
of this amount may be awarded with the approval of the chief judge of the circuit. 21 U.S.C. §
848(q)(10)(B).
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case law is that the "reasonably necessary" analysis differs depending on whether
resources are sought before or after the filing of the petition. As the following
discussion of these standards shows, counsel are almost always better off re-
questing resources before filing the petition.
C. Requests for Resources Before Filing The Petition
When resources are requested under section 848(q)(9) before the petition
is filed, the analysis of whether such services are reasonably necessarywill depend
on whether defense counsel is seeking investigative or expert services.
1. Investigative Services
A request for an investigator must include an explanation of: (1) the necessity of an
investigator, (2) the exact duties to beperformed by the investigator and (3) the reasons why the
attorneys cannot perform the investigation.2" Under this three-part requirement, the
district court in DeLong v. Thompson 26 found that an investigator was not reason-
ably necessary to probe into the "professional and personal" backgrounds of the
defendant's trial attorneys or the presiding judge's potential conflicts of interest.'
DeLong thus provides little guidance into the relative weight of each of the three
factors.
However, as a re-investigation of the case outside of the trial transcript is
necessary to discover possible constitutional errors in the defendant's conviction
and death sentence, it seems that the "necessity for an investigator" stems
directly from the need to provide competent representation. Furthermore, due
to the massive amount of work required to competently investigate the case, it
should also be clear why habeas counsel cannot perform all parts of the investiga-
tion without assistance.
2. Expert Services
In Wright v. Angelone, the Fourth Circuit held that expert services are
reasonably necessary to the representation under section 848(q)(9) when a
"substantial question exists over an issue requiring expert testimony for its
resolution and the defendant's position cannot be fully developed without
professional assistance."29 The defendant in Wrght sought the services at federal
habeas of a court-appointed neurologist to determine whether the defendant
suffered from an organic brain disorder. The neurologist's services were appar-
ently sought in connection with a penalty trial ineffective assistance of counsel
25. DeLong v. Thompson, 790 F. Supp. 594, 617 (E.D. Va. 1991).
26. 790 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Va. 1991).
27. DeLong, 790 F. Supp. at 617.
28. 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
29. Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151,163 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Williams v. Martin, 618
F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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claim. In affirming the district court's denial of this request, the Fourth Circuit
relied entirely on the fact that the defendant had been examined by three mental
health experts before trial.30 All three experts had determined that the defendant
was not brain damaged. Therefore, the court held that the services of a fourth
expert were not reasonably necessary to research an issue that had been "thor-
oughly investigated, presented to the jury, and ultimately resolved at trial.'
Wrigbt is troubling for several reasons. First, the reasonably necessary
standard adopted by the court is the same standard previously used to determine
whether an expert is constitutionally required to assist an indigent defendant in
the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense.3 2 This standard was
adopted prior to the promulgation of section 84 8 (q)(9 ) and does not reflect the
arguably more lenient statutory standard. In addition, it can be argued that if the
section 848(q)(9) reasonably necessary standard is based on the constitutional
standard for appointment of experts then its definition would be a fluid one,
changing in conjunction with the evolution of constitutional law.
33
Burris v. Parke,34 a case cited by the court in Wight, sheds some light on the
application of the reasonably necessary standard in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. In Burns, the defendant raised an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim challenging the performance of his counsel at the penalty
phase of his trial. The defendant's habeas counsel sought the appointment of a
mental health expert to determine whether the defendant was suffering from a
brain injury at the time of the offense as a result of previously being shot in the
head -- an argument not raised by defense counsel in the penalty phase.
The Seventh Circuit held that the appointment of a mental health expert
was not reasonably necessary and upheld the district court's denial of the defen-
dant's request.3 s In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals found that the
findings of an expert appointed for habeas proceedings would be irrelevant so
long as the performance of trial counsel did not fall beneath the standard of
30. Wright, 151 F.3d at 163.
31. Id A very real question remains, however, concerning the qualifications of particular
experts to diagnose particular conditions. See Case Note on WFright v. Ange/one, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 185
(1998).
32. In Williams P. Mar'in, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), the court ofappeals held that the trial
court's denial of the defendant's request for an expert constituted a denial of the defendant's 14th
Amendment equal protection rights. Wlilfams, 618 F.2d at 1027. In Wrigbt, the Fourth Circuit
adopted this standard verbatim to define the section 8 48(q)(9 ) requirement that federal funding is
available only for experts which are reasonably necessary to the defendant's representation.
33. For example, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when
a defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a "significant factor" at
trial, the trial court must appoint a competent psychiatrist to assist the defense. Id at 83. Although
it may appear that characterization of an issue as a "substantial question" under Wright or a
"significant factor" under Ake is nothing but an exercise in semantics, even such minor differences
in language may be interpreted inconsistently by the courts.
34. 116 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1997).
35. Burris v. Parke, 116 F.3d, 256, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1997).
1998]
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reasonableness required by the Sixth Amendment.3 6 As the defendant had been
subjected to three separate mental examinations -- two before trial and one
before sentencing -- the court of appeals found that the failure of trial counsel
to seek further mental examinations of the defendant was not objectively unrea-
sonable.3 7 Since there was no colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the appointment of experts to develop such a claim was not reasonably neces-
sag. 38
This analysis has been applied by other federal courts. Thus, it is accepted
that the appointment of an expert is not reasonably necessary where the constitu-
tional claim for which such expert assistance is sought cannot be reviewed on the
merits or the claim would not be successful on the merits regardless of the
expert's finding.39
Wright and Burris should be strictly limited to their facts. At most they stand
for the proposition that the appointment of an expert is not reasonably necessary
when multiple experts have previously researched the exact issue which a defen-
dant seeks to raise in the federal habeas proceedings. Thus, Winght should not
bar the appointment of an expert for federal habeas proceedings, even where an
identical expert was utilized at trial, so long as the habeas expert researches an
issue unexplored by the trial expert. Additionally, the appointment of experts
may be reasonably necessary when no such expert was obtained by trial counsel.
Habeas counsel may take advantage of the sparse case law regarding applica-
tion of the reasonably necessary standard to seek the services of any and all
experts who will potentially be able to assist in the development of viable consti-
tutional claims. The standards articulated in DeLong and Wn/ight are flexible and
may be adapted to allow many types of requests for expert and investigative
assistance depending on the facts and creative thinking of habeas counsel.
D. Requests For Resources After Filing Petition
Should habeas counsel wait until after the petition is filed to seek funding
for expert or investigative services such services will be much harder to come by
than if requested prior to the filing of the petition. Since the only role for such
"post-petition" experts would be to testify at an evidentiary hearing, the appoint-
ment of an expert is reasonably necessary only when the defendant is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing.' AEDPA places new restrictions on the authority of
district courts to grant evidentiary hearings. Thus, habeas counsel must be
familiar with this new standard to make a colorable argument that an evidentiary
36. Burris, 116 F.3d at 259. Seeinfra Section III, PartE (discussing the Stricklandv. IWashington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
37. Bums, 116 F.3d at 259.
38. Id
39. See Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp.2d 497, 519 (E.D.Va. 1998).
40. Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743,753 (4th Cir. 1993).
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hearing is allowed under AEDPA and the court is therefore permitted to autho-
rize the provision of services under section 84 8 (q)(9 ).
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(e)(2) provides:
If the appkcant hasfaikd to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim
unless the applicant shows that-
(A) the claim relies on
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable
factflnder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
4 1
Under this section of AEDPA, defendants who have failed to develop a factual
basis for their claims must make two showings to obtain an evidentiary hearing.
The first showing can be satisfied in one of two ways -- either the claim relies on
new Supreme Court constitutional law or it is based on a previously undiscover-
able factual predicate. In addition, the defendant must show his or her probable
innocence of the underlying offense.42 Unquestionably, this standard will prevent
most, if not all, of the defendants subject to its strictures from obtaining an
evidentiary hearing for their federal habeas petitions.
This is not as bad as it might seem. The heavy burden created by section
2254(e)(2) is placed only on defendants who have failed to develop facts in state
court proceedings. In Cardwell v. Greene,43 the Fourth Circuit held that a habeas
defendant who diligently seeks to develop the factual basis of a claim for habeas
relief, but has been denied the opportunity to do so by the state court, is not
precluded under section 2254(e)( 2 ) from obtaining an evidentiary hearing in
federal court.' Ironically, the Supreme Court of Virginia's categorical rejection
ofrequests for resources in state habeas proceedings will actually prove beneficial
in avoiding the requirements of section 2254(e)(2) as interpreted by the Cardwel
court.
The facts of Cardwellare illustrative. After affirmance of his death sentence
by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Cardwell raised a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in his state habeas petition. The Supreme Court of Virginia
denied Cardwell's motion for appointment of experts and summarily denied the
petition.4' The Fourth Circuit held that, under these circumstances, Cardwell had
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(emphasis added).
42. This provision of AEDPA apparently modifies Kteng v. Tamqyo-Riyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992),
by requiring a habeas defendant to show both cause for the failure to develop the facts in state
proceedings and probable innocence.
43. 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998). See Case Note on Cardwellv. Greene, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 77(1998).
44. Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998).
45. Cardwel, 152 F.3d at 335.
1998]
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not failed to develop the facts of his claim in the state proceedings and was not
subject to the requirements of section 2254(e)(2).
45
The Cardwell court recognized that section 2254(e)(2) presents an "initial
hurdle" for habeas defendants." The defendant can clear this hurdle by showing
either that he or she did not fail to develop facts in state court proceedings or by
meeting the dual requirements of section 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). However, "even if
[the defendant's] claim is not precluded by section 2254(e)(2), that does not mean
that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing-only that he may be.",47  Once the
defendant clears the section 2254(e)(2) hurdle, the district court will then con-
sider whether an evidentiary hearing is either appropriate or required by applying
pre-AEDPA law.48
Under Cardwell, when the Supreme Court of Virginia denies a state habeas
defendant's request for expert or investigative services and summarily dismisses
the petition, that defendant has not failed to develop the facts of the constitu-
tional claim within the meaning of section 2254(e)(2). The defendant may then
argue either that the sixth circumstance of Townsend requires an evidentiary
hearing or that the district court should exercise its discretionary authority to
conduct a hearing. However, in order to take advantage of this rule, it is essential
that state habeas counsel raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim request
that the Supreme Court of Virginia appoint experts or investigators to aid in the
preparation of the petition. This will allow the defendant to avoid the rigid
requirements of section 2254(e)(2) and preserve the defendant's right to a federal
habeas evidentiary hearing.49 Once the defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing
45. Id at 338.
46. Id at 337.
47. Id at 338 (quoting McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056,1059-60 (5th Cir. 1998)).
48. Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337. The court in Cardwell cited Townsend v. Sann, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), and Keenfy v. Tamayo-Ryes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), as the controlling pre-AEDPA law governing
the ability of the district court to grant evidentiary hearings. A federal court possesses the discre-
tionary authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing "where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus
allege[d] facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief." Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312. Further-
more, an evidentiary hearing is required where: "(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not
resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not supported by the record as
a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it
appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing."
Id at 313.
Keeney modified Townsends fifth circumstance, holding that where a defendant's failure to
develop the critical facts relevant to his federal claim was attributable to inexcusable neglect, an
evidentiary hearing is required only if the defendant can show cause for the failure and actual
prejudice resulting from that failure. Keengy, 504 U.S. at 11.
49. The fact that a defendant has additional expert opinions to present in federal habeas
proceedings does not, by itself, require the district court to grant an evidentiary hearing. Cardwell
recognizes that the district court may simply expand the record to include the expert reports.
Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 338-39. Thus, to maximize the chances that an evidentiary hearing will be
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is established, the district court may then authorize the appointment of experts
under section 848.51
E. Using Section 8 4 8 (q)(9) to Resurrect Proceduraly Defaulted Claims
The frequency with which federal habeas courts apply the independent and
adequate state grounds doctrine to avoid hearing federal claims on the merits in
capital cases is alarming. This is especially true given the fact that almost half of
these cases contain federal constitutional error.5 2 A recent examination of thirty-
three capital cases in Virginia over a ten year period revealed a total of ninety-
eight claims which the Supreme Court of Virginia held to be procedurally
barred. 3 Of course, any federal claims included among the ninety-eight were
forever precluded from federal review. 4
Given this situation, federal habeas counsel will often begin their representa-
tion at a disadvantage as colorable constitutional claims will have been defaulted
at various stages of the state proceedings. This section explains the methods by
which procedurally defaulted federal claims may be resurrected for review on the
merits. It also explores whether resources available under section 8 4 8 (q)(9 ) may
be "reasonably necessary" to resurrect defaulted claims.
It may seem unconventional to ask a federal court for expert or investigative
services to assist in the groundwork necessary for the resurrection of a procedur-
ally defaulted federal claim. However, the language of section 848(q)(9) is
arguably broad enough to encompass such endeavors. Under section 8 4 8 (q)( 9 ),
a court may authorize habeas counsel to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services upon a finding that such services are "reasonably necessaryfortbe represen-
tation of the defendant. . . ,,s5 A colorable argument exists that adequate representa-
tion of the defendant includes not only the investigation and preparation of
viable federal claims but also a full investigation into the possibilities of overcom-
ing procedural defaults.
Two general mechanisms allow the resurrection of procedurally defaulted
federal claims for consideration on the merits. Generally, a federal court may
hear the claim if the defendant shows either (1) cause for the default and actual
prejudice arising therefrom or (2) that failure to consider the claim will result in
a fundamental miscarriage of justice.5 6 Each will be considered in turn.
granted, defense counsel should attempt to develop a genuine issue of material fact relating to the
expert opinion which requires an evidentiary hearing for resolution.
51. See supra note 40.
52. See supra note 1.
53. Carey L. Cooper, The Never Ending Story: Combating Procedural Bars In Capital Cases, CAP.
DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 38 (1997).
54. See supra note 7.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1991) (emphasis added).
56. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
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1. Cause and Actual Prejudice
A federal court may consider a procedurally defaulted federal claim if the
defendant can demonstrate "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result
of the alleged violation of federal law.""7 Constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel constitutes cause for the default.58
Strickland v. Washington 5' set forth the well-known two-part ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis. The defendant must show that the performance
of trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 60 and that the
defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. 6' A defendant estab-
lishes prejudice under Stricklandwhere there is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different and
confidence in the outcome is thereby undermined.62 Specifically, when a capital
defendant challenges the performance of counsel in the selection part of the
trial's penalty phase, the defendant must show that there exists a "reasonable
probability that absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."'
A defendant who establishes "cause" under Murray (by meeting the Strick-
land test for ineffective assistance of counsel) must next satisfy Murray's "actual
prejudice" requirement. Of course, the defendant has already shown the exis-
tence of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. Actual prejudice, how-
ever, requires the defendant to raise Strickland prejudice to a higher level by
showing that the constitutional error worked to the defendant's "actual and
substantial disadvantage."6'
In sum, a defendant seeking to raise a procedurally defaulted claim under
Murray must show that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel
(Strickland cause and prejudice) and then prove that the prejudice can be charac-
57. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
58. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be predicated on the performance of trial or direct appeal counsel. As there is no constitu-
tional right to counsel in state or federal habeas proceedings, there is no corresponding right to
effective assistance of counsel in habeas proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). This
principle extends to claims which are not cognizable on direct appeal and may be raised for the first
time in state habeas. Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1997).
59. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
61. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
62. Id at 694.
63. Id at 695. In Virginia capital trials, the "selection" part of the penalty phase occurs after
the trier of fact has found the existence beyond a reasonable doubt of one or both of the aggravat-
ing factors -- "vileness" or "future dangerousness." At least one aggravating factor must be found
for the defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, thus the consideration of the existence of these
aggravating factors is referred to as the "eligibility" part of the penalty phase. See Case Summary of
Buchanan v. Angelone, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 10, no. 2, p. 4 (1998) (discussing these two components of
the penalty phase).
64. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986).
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terized as actual prejudice. Habeas counsel may argue that investigative and
expert services are reasonably necessary to develop the ineffective assistance
claim63 and thus are reasonably necessary "for the representation of the defen-
dant."'
2. A Fundamental Miscarriage ofjustice -- The Actual Innocence Gateway to Resurrection
Apart from showing cause and prejudice under Murray, a defendant may also
resurrect procedurally defaulted federal claims by demonstrating that a failure to
consider such claims will result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."
'6 5
Under this principle, a federal habeas court may review the defendant's federal
claims if the defendant can show either innocence of the underlying offense66 or
innocence of the death penalty.
a. Innocence of the Underying Offense
A showing of innocence of the underlying offense exists when a defendant
presents "new reliable evidence"6 that a "constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."'69 This requires that
the defendant show that it is "more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in light of the new evidence."7
In Schlup, the U.S. Supreme Court noted three types of new evidence -
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness evidence and critical
physical evidence - which might establish a colorable claim of actual innocence.7 1
Investigative, expert, or other services may well be the only way to discover such
evidence. As such, these services would arguably be reasonably necessary for the
representation.
63. See supra Section III, Part C.
64. In order for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to provide cause for a procedural
default under Murny, the ineffective assistance claim must itself be a valid freestanding claim that
has been presented to the state courts. Murry, 477 U.S. at 489. The Fourth Circuit has held that
a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance claim cannot serve as "cause" even if counsel is
attempting to resurrect an unrelated constitutional claim. Justus v. Murray, 897 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1990). The defendant in Justus sought to raise several procedurally defaulted claims in his federal
habeas petition. The defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which
constituted "cause" for resurrecting the claims. However, the defendant's ineffective assistance
claim was also procedurally defaulted. As such, the court of appeals found that the ineffective
assistance claim could not provide cause to resurrect the other defaulted claims. Justus, 897 F2d. at
715.
65. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
66. Schlup v. Delo, 513.U.S. 298 (1995).
67. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
68. Scblup, 513 U.S. at 324.
69. Id at 327 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).
70. Id at 330.
71. Id at 324.
1998]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
It is less certain if the services of a mental expert will be reasonably neces-
sary when the expert is sought to find "new" evidence relating to the defendant's
mens rea at the time of the offense. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Stewart v.
Angelone "4 is illustrative of this problem. In Stewart, a mental health expert
testified on behalf of Stewart at trial. However, the expert concluded that
Stewart did not suffer from any mental illnesses at the time of the offense that
would have negated the requisite mens rea. In his federal habeas petition,
Stewart presented the affidavit of a pathologist who had reviewed Stewart's case
file. The pathologist determined that Stewart "may suffer" from temporal lobe
epilepsy. This claim, if proven, would negate the mens rea for capital murder.
Such evidence, Stewart argued, established a colorable claim of actual innocence
and thus allowed the federal court to consider his procedurally defaulted federal
claims on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Stewart's argument, holding that the patholo-
gist's affidavit did not constitute "new evidence" under Schlup.n In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the pathologist had based his analysis
on the same evidence as the trial expert but had reached a different conclusion.76
Furthermore, the pathologist's conclusion that Stewart might suffer from tempo-
ral lobe epilepsy was based "principally" on the report of the trial expert con-
tained in Stewart's file.'
Stewart may appear to present a serious obstacle to raising actual innocence
claims based on mental state evidence. However, its holding is a limited one and
should be recognized as such. Stewart does not foreclose the possibility that,
under different facts, the findings of a habeas mental expert may constitute "new
evidence" under Schlup. Such a conclusion might be based on the habeas expert's
own preliminary examination of the defendant or on evidence not discovered by
the trial expert.
b. Innocence of the Death Pena4)
A federal court may review a capital defendant's procedurally defaulted
claims if the defendant can show by clear and convincing evidence that "but for
a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the defendant
eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.""8 This gateway to
the resurrection of defaulted claims is limited to errors in the eligibility phase of
74. No. 97-26, 1998 WL 276291, at *1 (4th Cir. May 29, 1998) (unpublished disposition).
75. Stewart v. Angelone, No. 97-26, 1998 WL 276291, at *4 (4th Cir. May 29, 1998).
76. Stewart, 1998 WL 276291, at *4. See alro Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610,618 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1997) ("[P]utting a different spin on evidence that was presented to the
jury does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Schlup.") (quoting Bannister v. Delo, 904 F. Supp.
998, 1004 (W.D. Mo. 1995)).
77. Stewart, 1998 WL 276291, at *4.
78. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
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the sentencing proceeding and does not include alleged constitutional errors in
the presentation of mitigating evidence during the selection phase.79 Thus, under
Virginia law, a defendant must argue that, but for the constitutional error at the
penalty phase, no reasonable juror would have found future dangerousness or
vileness beyond a reasonable doubt.
80
It is important to remember that under Virginia law, a conviction of capital
murder is the underlying offense. Evidence negating an element of the capital
murder conviction should be considered under Schiup rather than the more
stringent Sayer standard. For example, evidence negating the rape or robbery
predicates of section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code would be evaluated under
Scblup. Conversely, evidence negating the defendant's future dangerousness must
be considered under Sayer.1
3. The Continued Viabiliy ofSchlup and Sawyer in Resurrecting Defaulted Claims
The Commonwealth has attempted to argue in at least one case that
AEDPA has abolished the "innocence of the death penalty" method of resurrect-
ing procedurally defaulted claims previously available under Sawyer. In Weeks v.
Angelone,"2 the Commonwealth relied on both 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) and 28 U.S.C.
2254(e) (2) to argue that Sawyer had been statutorily overruled. 3 The district
court rejected this argument. 8' Although section 2264(a) appears to severely limit
the ability of a federal court to consider claims not raised in state court, this
section is only available to "opt-in" states which meet certain requirements
concerning the appointment of qualified counsel to indigent defendants and
compensation for such counsel.8 " The Virginia statutory habeas counsel appoint-
ment scheme fails to satisfy this requirement and thus the Commonwealth
cannot avail itself of the benefits available to "opt-in" states, including section
2264(a). 6 Second, section 2254(e)(2), while applicable to all states, deals only
with the ability of federal habeas courts to conduct evidentiary hearings. While
an evidentiary hearing may, as a practical matter, increase the chances that a
defendant will succeed on the merits of the petition, it does not preclude the
federal courts from considering the claim on its merits.8 7
Although the Commonwealth's argument is a loser (unless Virginia becomes
an "opt-in" state), habeas counsel should be aware that the Commonwealth may
79. Sanyer, 505 U.S. at 345.
80. See supra note 61.
81. See Case Note on Calderon v. Thompson, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 47 (1998).
82. 4 F. Supp.2d 497 (E.D. Va. 1998).
83. Weeks, 4 F. Supp.2d at 507.
84. Id. at 509.
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261.
86. Weeks, 4 F. Supp.2d at 506.
87. Id at 509.
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continue to recycle this argument and be prepared to explain why, under Weeks,
it lacks merit."8
4. Proceeding Through the Innocence Gateway - The Needfor Experts
The U.S. Supreme Court formulated the Schiup and Sayerstandards to deal
only with the "extraordinary case."89 Clearly then, Schiup and Sanyer will not
frequently provide grounds for habeas relief. However, the need for expert or
investigative assistance to even raise a colorable Schlup or Sanyer claim is equally
obvious as the grounds for such claims may be found anywhere but the trial
transcript.
IV. Conclusion
An unfortunate hallmark of criminal proceedings is the disparity in re-
sources available to the prosecution versus the defense counsel representing an
indigent client. This inequity squarely conflicts with the defense counsel's duty
to zealously and competently represent his or her client in state and federal
habeas proceedings. Section 848(q)(9) is no panacea. It will not be available to
habeas counsel in all, or possibly even most, cases. However, zealous representa-
tion requires that all potential claims be unearthed and developed as fully as
possible for consideration on the merits. In this endeavor, section 84 8 (q)(9 ) does
provide a mechanism through which diligent and creative counsel may attempt
to secure meaningful habeas review in the federal courts.
88. In addition, the recent Supreme Court decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489
(1998), supports the continued viability of Sawyer. See Case Note on CaMeron v. Thompson, 11 CAP.
DEF.J. 47 (1998).
89. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995).
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